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ABSTRACT
This paper presents TouchAuth, a new touch-to-access de-
vice authentication approach using induced body electric
potentials (iBEPs) caused by the indoor ambient electric field
that is mainly emitted from the building’s electrical cabling.
The design of TouchAuth is based on the electrostatics of
iBEP generation and a resulting property, i.e., the iBEPs at
two close locations on the same human body are similar,
whereas those from different human bodies are distinct. Ex-
tensive experiments verify the above property and show that
TouchAuth achieves high-profile receiver operating char-
acteristics in implementing the touch-to-access policy. Our
experiments also show that a range of possible interfering
sources including appliances’ electromagnetic emanations
and noise injections into the power network do not affect the
performance of TouchAuth. A key advantage of TouchAuth
is that the iBEP sensing requires a simple analog-to-digital
converter only, which is widely available onmicrocontrollers.
Compared with existing approaches including intra-body
communication and physiological sensing, TouchAuth is
a low-cost, lightweight, and convenient approach for au-
thorized users to access the smart objects found in indoor
environments.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The indoor environments are increasingly populated with
smart objects. It is estimated that by 2022, a typical fam-
ily home could contain more than 500 smart devices [14].
Managing the access with many objects, including accessing
the information on them or granting them to access certain
information, becomes challenging. Typing password is te-
dious and infeasible for the objects without a keyboard or
touchscreen. Biometrics-based user authentication suffers
various shortcomings. Fingerprint scanning requires a well
positioned finger press. Moreover, due to cost factor, small
objects will unlikely have fingerprint scanners. Face recog-
nition solutions require face positioning and are costly [27].
Voice recognition-based access can be disturbing in certain
environments, e.g., an open-plan office with colleagues, a
bedroom with sleeping buddies, etc. Moreover, defining a
separate voice passphrase for each smart object to avoid
incorrect invoking may result in too many passphrases.
In this paper, we aim to develop a low-cost and convenient
touch-to-access scheme that can be easily implemented on
smart objects found in indoor environments. Specifically,
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a simple touch on an object allows an authorized user to
access the object. This scheme will not require non-trivial in-
terferences for user interactions, e.g., touchscreen. Different
from integrating user identification (e.g., fingerprint scan-
ning) into the objects, we resort to a device authentication
approach that offloads the user’s identity to a personal wear-
able token device (e.g., a smart watch or bracelet) and uses
the token to access a touched object that has been previously
paired with the token. This touch-to-access device authenti-
cation approach can greatly improve the user’s convenience
and experience in interacting with the smart objects. For
instance, in a home with multiple residents, when a user
wearing his token turns on a TV set using a smart remote
control, the control obtains the user identity from the token
and instructs the TV set to list the user’s favorite channels.
The user can also touch other smart objects to personalize
them, e.g., touch a music player for the favorite music, switch
on a light that automatically tunes to the user’s favorite color
temperature or hue, etc.
If the user can protect the personal wearable token well,
the touch-to-access device authentication can also be used
in more access-critical scenarios. For example, a touch on a
smartphone or tablet unlocks the device’s screen automati-
cally, allows in-app purchases, passes the parental controls,
etc. Beyond the above use scenarios for improved conve-
nience in access control, the touch-to-access scheme can
also enhance the security of various systems. For instance, it
can be used with fingerprint scanning to form a two-factor
authentication against fake fingerprints. A wireless reader
can access a worn medical sensor only if the reader has a
physical contact with the wearer’s skin. The contact enforces
the wearer’s awareness regarding the access and prevents
remote wireless attacks with stolen credentials [17]. Thus,
the touch-to-access scheme will be more secure than the
existing hardware token approaches such as Duo [9].
The essence of the touch-to-access scheme is the detection
of whether the wearable token and the smart object in ques-
tion have physical contact with the same user’s body. Exist-
ing studies tackle this same-body contact detection problem
by intra-body communication (IBC) [2, 19, 26, 30, 37, 44, 53]
and physiological sensing such as electrocardiography (ECG)
[20, 32, 38, 42, 47], photoplethysmogram (PPG) [20, 32, 42],
and electromyogram (EMG) [52]. IBC requires either non-
trivial customized transceivers [2, 26, 30, 37, 53] or a touch-
screen as the receiver [19, 44], resulting in increased cost
or reduced applicable scope. The physiological sensing ap-
proaches are based on a body-area property, i.e., the physi-
ological signals captured from the same human body have
similar values or features, whereas those collected from dif-
ferent human bodies are distinct. However, the physiological
sensors are often bulky due to the required physical distances
among a sensor’s electrodes [3, 52]. Furthermore, they often
need careful placement and may perform poorly in daily life
settings [4].
Different from IBC and physiological sensing, in this pa-
per, we investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of using
induced body electric potential (iBEP) due to the body an-
tenna effect for touch-to-access device authentication. As
a non-physiological phenomenon, the body antenna effect
refers to the alteration of the intensity of the mains hum
captured by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) when the
ADC has a physical contact with a human body. The mains
hum induced by the building’s electrical cabling is ubiqui-
tous. In addition, ADC is a basic electronic component that is
widely available on microcontrollers. Recent studies have ex-
ploited the body antenna effect for key stroke detection [10],
touch sensing [8], motion detection [6], gesture recognition
[7], and wearables clock synchronization [49]. These stud-
ies leverage several characteristics of iBEP, such as signal
intensity alteration [10] and periodicity [49], or feed iBEP
signals to machine learning algorithms for motion and ges-
ture recognition [6–8]. Differently, to use iBEP for device
authentication, its body-area property and the underlying
physical mechanism need to be well understood. To the best
of our knowledge, these issues have not been studied.
In this paper, we discuss in detail the physical mechanism
of the iBEP’s generation and its body-area property. The
iBEP measurement by an ADC is the difference between
the electric potentials of the ADC pin and the ground1 of
the sensor, respectively. From electrostatics, a human body,
which can be viewed as an uncharged conductor, will alter its
nearby electric field (EF) emitted from the electrical cabling
of the building due to electrostatic induction. As a result,
the iBEP measurement by a sensor will be affected by the
presence of a nearby human body. In particular, we make the
following two hypotheses based on the above understanding.
First, the iBEP signals measured by two sensors that are on
the same human body and close to each other will be similar.
This is because 1) the two sensors’ ADC pins will have the
same potential due to their connections to the equipotential
human body, and 2) their grounds will most likely have
similar potentials as they are close to each other in the EF.
Second, the iBEP signals collected from different human
bodies will be different. This is because different human
bodies will most likely have different potentials and thus
affect nearby EFs differently since they build up different
surface charge distributions in the electrostatic induction.
Our extensive measurement results are consistent with
the above two hypotheses. Based on the results, we design
a prototype system called TouchAuth that performs touch-
to-access device authentication based on iBEP signals. We
implement the same-body contact detection algorithm based
1Throughout this paper, “ground” refers to the floating ground of a device.
on two similarity metrics, i.e., absolute Pearson correlation
coefficient (APCC) and root mean square error (RMSE). Ex-
tensive experiments show that the APCC-based TouchAuth
achieves true acceptance rates of 94.2% and 98.9% subject to
a false acceptance rate upper bound of 2% when one and five
seconds of iBEP signal is recorded, respectively. In contrast,
ECG/PPG approaches [20, 32, 42] need to record the signal(s)
for tens of seconds to achieve comparable detection accuracy
(cf. §8). Our experiments also show that various possible
interfering sources including appliances’ electromagnetic
emanations and noise injections into power networks do not
affect TouchAuth.
In summary, TouchAuth is a low-cost, lightweight, and
convenient approach for the authorized users to access smart
objects in indoor environments. To implement TouchAuth,
the smart object’s and the wearable token’s microcontroller
ADCs are to bewired to their conductive exteriors. Compared
with the near-field communication (NFC) approach that en-
forces a proximity requirement on device authentication,
the touch requirement of TouchAuth is more intuitive and
clearer. Moreover, compared with the ADCs that are widely
available on microcontrollers, the NFC chips are more costly
and need to be integrated into the smart objects to read the
wearable tags.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We explain the generation mechanism of iBEP and
show that iBEP is an effective signal for devising a
touch-to-access device authentication approach.
• We design an iBEP-based device authentication ap-
proach called TouchAuth. It uses iBEPs to detect whether
two devices are in proximity on the same human body.
• Extensive experiments under real-world settings are
conducted to evaluate the performance of TouchAuth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. §2 presents
the system and threat models, and the approach overview.
§3 presents the electrostatics of iBEP generation and states
the objective of this paper. §4 presents the measurement
study. §5 and §6 design and evaluate TouchAuth, respec-
tively. §7 discusses several issues. §8 reviews related work.
§9 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
2.1 System Model
We consider an authentication system with two devices that
have been previously paired, i.e., an authenticator and an au-
thenticatee. We assume that the two devices have a wireless
communication channel, e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth (Low Energy),
Zigbee, etc. The pairing enables them to communicate. The
authenticator is a trustworthy device that can sense the iBEP
signal s(t), ∀t , at a location L on the body of a userU. To
be authenticated, the authenticatee presents its sensed iBEP
signal s ′(t), t ∈ [t1, t2], to the authenticator. The ℓ = t2 − t1 is
called signal length. The authenticatee is valid only if it has
physical contact with a location L ′ onU which is close to
L such that s ′(t) ≈ s(t), ∀t ∈ [t1, t2]; otherwise, it is invalid.
The valid authenticatee will be granted a certain access; the
invalid authenticatee will be denied the access. We assume
that the clocks of the authenticator and the authenticatee
are synchronized, such that the authenticator can select a
segment of s(t) in the time duration [t1, t2] to check the simi-
larity between s(t) and s ′(t) for same-body contact detection.
Before the authentication process, clock synchronization can
be achieved using existing approaches [24, 25, 49].
We now discuss the roles of different devices in the sce-
narios discussed in §1. When the user with a wrist wear-
able token touches a smartphone to unlock its screen, the
wearable token is the authenticator, whereas the automatic
unlock program on the phone is the authenticatee. On de-
tecting human touch (by either button/touchscreen press or
increased iBEP intensity), the unlock program presents its
captured iBEP signal to the wearable token that will perform
the same-body detection. A positive detection result allows
the program to unlock the smartphone; otherwise, the pro-
gram should not unlock the phone. In the example of worn
medical sensor access, the medical sensor is the authentica-
tor, whereas the wireless reader is the authenticatee. Only
the reader that has physical contact with the sensor wearer
will receive a one-time password to access the data on the
sensor. In the less access-critical examples of personalizing
smart objects, the wearable token (i.e., the authenticator)
transmits the user’s identity to the touched smart object (i.e.,
the valid authenticatee) for personalization.
2.2 Threat Model
We adopt the same threat model that is used for an ECG-
based device authentication system in [38]. Specifically, we
consider an adversary who fully controls the communication
channel between the authenticator and any valid authentica-
tee and aims at impersonating the valid authenticatee. The
channel control includes eavesdropping, dropping, modi-
fying, and forging messages as desired. The adversary can
corrupt neither the authenticator nor the valid authenticatee.
2.3 Approach Overview
Fig. 1 illustrates an authentication process of our approach.
The authentication process can be initiated by the authenti-
catee upon it detects a human touch based on iBEP. After a
handshake with a nearby authenticator, a Transport Layer Se-
curity (TLS) connection is set up between the authenticator
and the authenticatee to ensure data confidentiality, integrity,
and freshness of consequent communications. TLS is feasible
on mote-class platforms [13, 39]. Because the authenticatee’s
authenticator
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Figure 1: Left: A use scenario where the smart watch
personalizes a remote control and the associated me-
dia system by a touch; Right: authentication process.
certificate presented during the TLS setup needs not to be
validated by the authenticator, our approach does not involve
a cumbersome public key infrastructure (PKI). Then, the two
parties synchronize their clocks and sample their respective
iBEPs s(t) and s ′(t) synchronously for ℓ seconds. After that,
following an existing protocol H2H [38] that is designed for
ECG-based device authentication, the two parties perform
a commitment-based data exchange to ensure the security
of the system against the threat defined in §2.2. Note that,
without using H2H, a naive approach of transmitting s ′(t)
from the authenticatee to the authenticator over the TLS
connection for contact detection is vulnerable to a man-in-
the-middle attack based on full channel control [38]. After
obtaining s ′(t), the authenticator runs a same-body contact
detection algorithm with s(t) and s ′(t) as inputs to decide
whether the authenticatee is valid. Lastly, the authenticator
notifies the authenticatee of acceptance or rejection.
Note that in the less security-critical use scenarios such
as smart object personalization, the TLS connection setup
can be skipped and the commitment-based data exchange
procedure can be replaced with a normal data exchange
procedure. This reduces overhead.
3 BASIS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
In this section, we discuss the physical basis of TouchAuth
(§3.1) and the research objective (§3.2).
3.1 Body Antenna Effect
First, we illustrate the body antenna effect. The two curves
in Fig. 2 are the measurement traces of a mote-class sensor
placed at a fixed position, with an ADC pin floating in the
air or pinched by a person, respectively. More details of the
sensor will be presented in §4.1. Without body contact, the
sensor captures the mains hum with weak amplitude and a
frequency of about 50Hz (i.e., the nominal grid frequency
in our region). With body contact, the signal has greater
amplitude and exhibits more clearly the frequency of 50Hz.
The above result shows that the human body affects the
reception of mains hum. Several recent studies [7, 10, 49]
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Figure 2: The body antenna effect.
exploited this human body antenna effect for various applica-
tions. However, they do not provide an in-depth explanation
of the effect. This section explains this effect in detail, which
will guide our experiments and the design of TouchAuth.
3.1.1 Electric field (EF) from electrical cabling. A line of
charge emits an EF, whereas a current through the line gener-
ates a magnetic field. Thus, a charged wire carrying alternat-
ing current (ac) will generate both time-varying electric and
magnetic fields. However, since the magnetic fields gener-
ated from the two close-lying current-carrying wires within
a single power cable tend to cancel each other, the overall
magnetic field around a power cable is normally very weak
[43].2 At the nominal frequency of the ac power grid, i.e., 50
or 60Hz, the power cable’s EF is an extremely low frequency
(ELF) radiation with a wavelength of thousands of miles. At
such a wavelength scale, we do not need to consider the
magnetic field excited by the time-varying EF. Thus, EF is
the main emanation from a power cable.
Modern buildings often have complex electrical cabling.
Permanent power cables run above ceilings, below floors,
on walls, etc. There are also power extension cords installed
by residents. As the EF from a cable is a vector field with
intensity attenuating with the distance from the cable, the
combined EF caused by all the cables in a building is a vector
field with a complex intensity distribution over the space. In
normal homes with 220V power supply, the intensity of the
combined EF is often between 3V/m and 30V/m [43]. The
EF is the superposition of the EFs emitted by surrounding
electrified power cables and appliances. Due to the spatial
distribution of the power cables and appliances, the gradients
of the EF at different locations are generally different.
Note that if an appliance is powered off, the intensity of
the EF from the power cable supporting the appliance will
remain unchanged. This is due to the fact that most switches
only break the connection in one wire, while the wires will
still have the same service voltage as when the appliance
is powered on. We conduct an experiment to verify this.
2The low-intensity net magnetic field due to a small mismatch between the
two wires’ currents, which is caused by the vagabond currents effect, is
sensible using special devices such as hall effect sensors and tank circuits
tuned to the power grid frequency.
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Figure 3: Mains hum measured by a sensor (without
human body contact) placed close to a power cord sup-
porting a 2kW heater.
Fig. 3(a) shows the mains hum measured by a sensor that
has a conductor wire connected to an ADC pin to improve
EF sensing and is placed close to a power cord supporting
a 2 kW heater. From the figure, the operating status of the
heater does not affect the measurements. Fig. 3(b) shows the
sensor’s measurements when the heater remains off and the
power cord is connected to or disconnected from the wall
outlet. We can see that the intensity of the sensor readings is
weaker when the power cord is diselectrified. The remaining
intensity is caused by the EFs from other electrified power
cables in the building. The above results suggest that (i) the
ambient field is an EF caused by the ac voltages, (ii) the
ac current changes caused by appliances’ operating status
changes have little impact on the ambient field.
3.1.2 Interactions among EF, sensor, and human body. First,
we discuss the situation without a human body. Our discus-
sions below concern a time instant only. As a typical sensor’s
ADC has high input impedance (hundreds of kΩ up to a few
MΩ), the ADC pin and the ground of the sensor can be con-
sidered insulated for simplicity of discussion. The ADC and
ground will have different potentials in the building’s ambi-
ent EF due to their physical distance. The potential difference
is the measurement of the sensor. For instance, in an EF with
an intensity up to 30V/m, if the equivalent distance between
the ADC pin and the ground is 1 cm, the measurement can
be up to 0.3V. This is consistent with our results in Figs. 2
and 3.
Now, we discuss the situation with a human body. A body
can be viewed as a conductor due to its low impedance (a
few kΩ [36]). From electrostatics, an uncharged conductor in
an EF will build up a surface charge distribution to reach an
electrostatic equilibrium, where the EF inside the conductor
is zero and the conductor’s surface is an equipotential surface
[35]. The surface charge distribution will generate an EF. As
a result, the EF combining that from the original source (i.e.,
electrical cabling) and the electrostatically induced conductor
(i.e., the human body) is different from the EF in the absence
of the conductor. In other words, the human body affects
uncharged
conductor
+
+
+
+
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Figure 4: Impact of an uncharged conductor (e.g., hu-
man body) on an EF from a point charge.White curves
represent equipotential lines. Image credit: Paul Fal-
stad [11].
its nearby EF. The change of field intensity results in the
change of potential difference between the sensor’s ADC
and ground, i.e., the sensor’s measurement.
We use a 2D electrostatics simulator [11] to generate an
example as shown in Fig. 4 that illustrates the human body’s
impact on ambient EF. When an uncharged conductor is in
the field, negative/positive surface charges will be built up.
As a result, the EF intensity, which is characterized by the
density of the equipotential lines, will change in the space
close to the electrostatically induced conductor. For instance,
in Fig. 4, the EF between the charge and the conductor is
intensified. The reading of a sensor in this area will increase
if its ADC and ground are arranged in the direction of the
field. In practice, the indoor EF will be much more complex
than the one shown in Fig. 4. Nevertheless, the example
provides a basic understanding of the body antenna effect.
3.2 Research Objective
As discussed in §3.1.2, the human body in an EF is an equipo-
tential conductor. Considering two sensors with their ADC
pins connected to the same human body, the potentials of
their ADC pins will be the same. If they are close to each
other, their grounds will have similar potentials. Thus, their
readings will be similar. If the two sensors are attached to
two locations on the human body which are far from each
other, their grounds will have different potentials. As a result,
though their ADC pins have the same potential due to the
human body contact, their readings will be different.
Now, we discuss the case where the two sensors are on
different human bodies. The human bodies will most likely
have different potentials. Moreover, even if we ignore the
impact of the two human bodies on the EF, because the two
sensors are at two different locations, the gradients of the
indoor EF at the two locations will be most likely different.
As a result, the two sensors’ measurements will be different.
This difference will be further intensified by the different
impacts of the two human bodies on their nearby EFs.
Our research objective is two-fold. First, we aim to ver-
ify the above inferences from the iBEP electrostatics via an
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Figure 6: Sensor placements.
extensive measurement study, which is the subject of §4. If
the measurement results are supportive of the inferences,
we will inquire whether iBEP sensing can be exploited to
implement the desirable touch-to-access scheme. This will
be addressed in §5 and §6.
4 MEASUREMENT STUDY
4.1 Measurement Setup
Our experiments are conducted using several Zolertia Z1
motes [54] and a Kmote [21]. Both types ofmotes are equipped
withMSP430 microcontroller and CC2420 802.15.4 radio. The
Z1 motes are used to collect iBEP data from human bodies,
whereas the Kmote is used as a base station to synchronize
the Z1 motes’ clocks and collect their iBEP data over wireless.
Each Z1 mote is powered by a lithiumion polymer battery;
the Kmote base station is connected to a desktop computer
through a USB cable. Each Z1 mote has two Phidgets sensor
ports connected to several ADC pins of its microcontroller.
We use a conductive wire as an electrode to create a physical
contact between a pin in one Phidgets sensor port and the
skin of the Z1 wearer. Fig. 5 shows a Z1 worn on a wrist.
The motes run TinyOS 2.1.2. The program running on the
Z1 mote samples the ADC at a rate of 500 sps. The samples
are timestamped using the Z1’s clock. The program uses a
reliable transmission protocol called Packet Link Payer [28]
to stream the samples to a Kmote base station. It also inte-
grates the Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP)
[25] to synchronize the Z1’s clock to the Kmote base station.
4.2 Measurement Results
We conduct three sets of experiments in a lab office.
4.2.1 Insensitivity to time-varying magnetic field (MF). To
verify that the body antenna effect is mainly caused by EF,
rather than MF, we build an MF generator and examine its
impact on iBEP sensing. Fig. 7 shows the schematic and the
implemented MF generator. It consists of a power amplifier
that weighs 2.6 kg, a 320mH inductor, and a 1 µF capacitor.
The power amplifier admits a specified signal waveform and
outputs the corresponding current to induce the inductor to
signal
template
power
amplifier
Oscilloscope
Inductor Capacitor
Power
Amplifier
Figure 7: Time-varying magnetic field generator.
generate time-varying MF. The capacitor is used to smooth
the output signal during the induction. In this experiment,
the specified signal is a 85Hz sinusoid. The choice of this
frequency has two reasons: a) As 85Hz is close to the grid
frequency of 50Hz in our region, the iBEP sensor will have
similar signal reception performance as for the 50Hz signal
from powerlines; b) The choice of 85Hz is also to avoid the
harmonics of the grid frequency, i.e., 100Hz, 150Hz and so on.
We configure the power amplifier to use its maximum gain.
From our tests, this generator causes strong interference to
nearby tank circuits that can sense MF changes. However,
from our experiments, it generates little impact on nearby
on-body Z1-based iBEP sensors. From a frequency analysis,
the power density of the iBEP signal at 85Hz is 66 times
weaker than that at 50Hz when the on-body iBEP sensor is
only 2 cm away from the inductor. The intensity of the signal
at 85Hz is similar to that of the ambient noise. The reason is
that the iBEP sensor (i.e., an ADC with floating ground) is an
open circuit, which cannot be induced by the time-varying
magnetic field. This result confirms that the body antenna
effect is mainly caused by EF.
4.2.2 iBEPs on the same body. First, Person A sits in a chair
and uses his right hand palm to hold two Z1 sensors steadily.
The ADCs of both sensors have direct contact with the palm
skin. In Fig. 6, the nodes numbered ❶ and ❷ illustrate the
placement of the two sensors. Fig. 8(a) shows the iBEPs
captured by the two sensors over two seconds. Fig. 8(b) shows
a zoomed-in view of Fig. 8(a). From the two figures, we
can see that the two iBEP signals are synchronous and of
the same amplitude level. This shows that, when the two
sensors are in proximity on the same human body, their
measurements are similar.
Second, we investigate the impact of spatial location on
iBEP. As discussed in §3.1, the indoor EF has an intensity dis-
tribution over space. Thus, the potential difference between
the human body and the ground of the sensor will vary with
location. In this experiment, Person A holds a sensor in his
palm with skin contact and stands at two spots in the lab.
Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(b) show the iBEPs at the two spots that are
about one meter apart. From the two figures, the amplitude
of the iBEP at Spot X is larger than that at Spot Y. Note that
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(a) Measurements of two sensors in two seconds.
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Figure 8: iBEPs measured by two sensors in the same
palm when the holder sits in a chair.
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Figure 9: iBEPsmeasured by a sensor in the same palm
when the wearer stands at different spots in the lab.
Spot X is closer to a cubicle with a number of electrified
power cables and power extensions.
Third, we investigate the impact of the sensor placement
on the received iBEP signal. We place three sensors on Per-
son A, two on the right arm and the remaining one on the
left arm. The two sensors on the right arm are separated
by about 15 cm, one of which is close to the wrist and the
other is close to the elbow. In Fig. 6, the nodes numbered
❸, ❹, and ❺ illustrate the placement of the three sensors.
In this experiment, the person stands and keeps a side lat-
eral raise posture. Fig. 10 shows the iBEP signals collected
from the three sensors in the same time period. Fig. 10(a)
shows the iBEPs measured by the two sensors on the right
arm. Fig. 10(b) shows the iBEPs measured by two sensors on
different arms. Fig. 10(c) shows the zoomed-in view for the
signals in Figs. 10(a) and 10(b). From the results, we can see
that the signals measured by the two sensors on the right
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Figure 10: iBEPs at different locations of Person A.
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Figure 12: APCCunder dif-
ferent clock offsets.
arm have similar amplitudes, but a phase shift of about 180◦.
This can be caused by that the ADC-to-ground directions of
the two sensors in the EF are different. Ignoring the phase
shift, the signals measured by the two sensors 15 cm apart on
the same arm exhibit higher similarity than those measured
by the two sensors on different arms, but lower similarity
than those measured by the two sensors in the same palm
as shown in Fig. 8(b).
We use the absolute Pearson correlation coefficient (APCC)
to quantify the similarity between two iBEP signals. The two
bars in the first bar group labeled (a) in Fig. 11 show the
APCCs between two iBEP signals collected from the same
and different arms on the same person, respectively. The
above results suggest that the correlation between the iBEPs
is affected by the distance between the sensors. When the
two sensors are closer, their iBEPs exhibit higher correlation.
This is supportive of our discussion in §3.2.
4.2.3 iBEPs on different bodies. In the first experiment, we
place two sensors in the palm of Person A and another sensor
in the palm of Person B. The two persons sit steadily 1m
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Figure 13: iBEPsmeasured by three sensors on twoper-
sons who sit steadily 1m apart.
apart. In Fig. 6, the nodes numbered ❶, ❷, and ❻ illustrate
the placement of the three sensors. Fig. 13(a) and Fig. 13(b)
show the iBEPs measured by the two sensors in Person A’s
palm and the two persons’ palms, respectively. Fig. 13(c)
shows the zoomed-in view. From the results, we can see
that the iBEP on Person B is clearly different from that on
Person A, in terms of both signal amplitude and waveform.
In contrast, the iBEPs on Person A are very similar. The two
bars in the second bar group labeled (b) in Fig. 11 show the
APCCs for the cases shown in Figs. 13(a) and 13(b). Clearly,
the iBEPs from the same body exhibit higher correlation than
those from different bodies. This result is supportive of our
discussion in §3.2.
In the second experiment, we investigate whether move-
ments will affect the distinctiveness. We ask the two persons
to perform some random hand movements. Fig. 14 and the
third bar group labeled (c) in Fig. 11 show the results. We can
see that, in the presence of movements, the iBEPs from the
same body still exhibit higher correlation than those from
different bodies.
In the above experiments, the clocks of the sensors are
tightly synchronized using FTSP that uses MAC-layer times-
tamping to achieve microsecond-level synchronization accu-
racy. PlatformswithoutMAC-layer timestamping can achieve
millisecond-level synchronization accuracy [24]. We now as-
sess the impact of a clock synchronization error of up to
10ms on the APCC. As our collected iBEP signals are tightly
synchronized, we simulate the clock synchronization error
by offseting an input iBEP signal. Fig. 12 shows the APCC
under different simulated clock offsets among the signals in
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Figure 14: iBEPs measured by three sensors on two
persons who sit 1m apart and perform random hand
movements.
Fig. 14. We can see that, in the presence of clock synchroniza-
tion error, the APCC for the signals from the same person is
generally higher than that for different persons. Moreover,
when the synchronization error is around −5ms or 5ms, the
APCCs are nearly zero. This is because the two signals have
a phase difference of 90°, resulting in near-zero correlations.
Our earlier study [49] shows that by using iBEP, wearables
on the same person or two nearby persons can maintain the
synchronization errors below 3ms. Such synchronization
errors will not subvert the APCC as an effective similarity
metric.
5 SAME-BODY CONTACT DETECTION
From §4.2, iBEP is promising for touch-to-access device au-
thentication. In this section, we present the design of the
same-body contact detection algorithm (§5.1) and discuss a
mimicry attack that aims at subverting the algorithm (§5.2).
5.1 Detection Algorithm
Before TouchAuth detects the same-body contact, it checks
the iBEP signal strength. Specifically, if the standard devi-
ation of either s(t) or s ′(t) is below a predefined threshold,
TouchAuth rejects the authentication request without per-
forming same-body contact detection. This ensures that the
detection is made based on meaningful iBEP signals. From
our offline tests, a standard deviation threshold of 0.06V is a
good setting for the Z1 platform. Similar offline tests can be
performed for other platforms. In what follows, we present
the same-body contact detection algorithm. The detection
performance will be evaluated in §6.
5.1.1 Similarity-based detector. The detector compares a
similarity score between s(t) and s ′(t), ∀t ∈ [t1, t2], with
a threshold denoted by η. If the similarity score is larger
than η, TouchAuth accepts the authenticatee; otherwise, it
rejects the authenticatee. We adopt the reciprocal of the root
mean square error (RMSE) and the absolute Pearson cor-
relation coefficient (APCC) as our similarity metrics. The
RMSE is a variant of the Euclidean distance which has been
used as a dissimilarity metric by physiological sensing ap-
proaches [32]. The Pearson correlation coefficient measures
the linear correlation between two variables. As shown in
Fig. 10, the iBEP signals collected from the same arm have
a phase shift of 180◦, resulting in a Pearson correlation of
about −1. However, the authenticatee on the same arm as the
authenticator may be accepted. This motivates us to use the
APCC as the similarity metric that ranges from 0 to 1, with
0 and 1 representing the lowest and the highest similarity
values, respectively. In the rest of this paper, the TouchAuth
based on the RMSE and APCC is called RMSE-TouchAuth and
APCC-TouchAuth, respectively.
Dynamic time warping distance (DTWD) is also a widely
adopted dissimilarity metric that can address time-varying
phase shift. From our experiments, it may wrongly help the
invalid authenticatee who is spatially close to the authenti-
cator. Thus, we do not adopt DTWD.
5.1.2 Assessment metrics. This paper uses the false accep-
tance rate (FAR or simply α ) and the true acceptance rate
(TAR or simply β) as the main detection performance met-
rics. The α and β are the probabilities that an invalid or valid
authenticatee is wrongly or correctly accepted, respectively.
The detection threshold η and the signal length ℓ are two
important parameters. The receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve of β versus α by varying η depicts fully the per-
formance of a detector under a certain ℓ. The signal length ℓ
characterizes the sensing time needed by the authentication
process. In this paper, we use the ROC curves to compare the
detection performance of various detectors. In practice, the
settings of η and ℓ can follow the Neyman-Pearson lemma to
enforce an upper bound for α . A stringent α is often required
by authentication. For instance, with α = 1%, an invalid au-
thenticatee needs to repeat the authentication process 100
times on average to be successful, which is frustrating if some
after-rejection freeze time is enforced. Moreover, an authen-
ticatee device can be banned if it is continuously rejected for
many times.
Fig. 15 shows the detection performance of APCC-TouchAuth
assessed by using the data shown in Fig. 14. Fig. 15(a) shows
the α and the false rejection rate (FRR) versus the detection
threshold η when ℓ is 0.5 s, 1 s, and 2 s, respectively. Note
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Figure 15: Detection performance of APCC-
TouchAuth when ℓ is 0.5 s, 1 s, and 2 s, respectively.
that FRR = 1− β . Fig. 15(b) shows the ROC curves when α is
from 0 to 2%. Note that the α and β values of each point on
the ROC are measured based on 500 tests. From the figure,
we can see that when ℓ = 2 s, APCC-TouchAuth achieves
a β value of 100% (i.e., correctly accepts all 500 tests when
the authenticatee is valid) while keeping α = 0% (i.e., cor-
rectly rejects all 500 tests when the authenticatee is invalid).
This suggests that APCC-TouchAuth can achieve a very high
detection accuracy. From Fig. 15(b), the ROC curve under a
smaller ℓ setting becomes lower, suggesting lower detection
accuracy. §6 will extensively evaluate the detection perfor-
mance of TouchAuth under a wider range of settings among
a larger group of users.
In addition to the ROC that characterizes detection per-
formance, we also use the signal-to-difference ratio (SDR) to
assess the quality of iBEP sensing. Specifically, let P[x(t)]
denote the average power of a signal x(t). Ideally, if the au-
thenticator and the valid authenticatee are very close to each
other on the same human body, their iBEP signals s(t) and
s ′(t) should be very similar. Thus, we define the SDR in deci-
bel as SDR = 10 log10
P [s(t )]
P [s(t )−s ′(t )] dB. A high SDR suggests
high-quality iBEP sensing.
5.2 Mimicry Attack
We now discuss a mimicry attack that attempts to obtain
the authenticator’s s(t). Due to the complex spatial distri-
bution of the indoor ambient EF, it is generally difficult for
the attacker to estimate the authenticator’s s(t). In this at-
tack, the attacker wearing an iBEP sensor mimics the body
movements of the victim user wearing the authenticator. To
be effective, the mimicry attacker should stay as close as
possible to the victim user to sense the same/similar ambient
EF. Thus, it is unrealistic in practice, because the strange
mimic behavior in proximity can be easily discerned by the
user. Note that this attack is beyond the threat model defined
in §2.2 that concerns the security of data communications
between the authenticator and the authenticatee. Thus, our
approach described in §2.3, which is based on the secure pro-
tocol H2H, does not guarantee security against this mimicry
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Figure 16: ROCs for 12 different wearers with the in-
valid authenticatee device. The x-axis and y-axis of
each subfigure are α and β , respectively.
attack. In §6, we will show the ineffectiveness of this attack
experimentally.
6 EVALUATION
We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate TouchAuth’s
same-body contact detection performance under a wide
range of settings including different wearers, various indoor
environments, multiple possible interfering sources, device
proximity, skin moisture, and heterogeneous devices.
6.1 Performance across Different Wearers
We collect a set of data involving a wearer R and 12 other
wearers P1,P2, . . . ,P12. The experiments are conducted in
a computer science lab. In the ith experiment (i = 1, . . . , 12),
R holds an authenticator device and a valid authenticatee
device in his palm, whereas Pi holds an invalid authenti-
catee device in his palm. Thus, in this set of experiments,
we evaluate the detection performance of TouchAuth for
a certain user with a valid authenticatee against different
users with invalid authenticatees. In each experiment, R
and Pi , which are about 0.5m apart, are allowed to perform
some uncoordinated and random hand movements. The data
collection of each experiment lasts for two minutes. We mea-
sure the detection performance of APCC-TouchAuth and
RMSE-TouchAuth as follows. Let NL , or NI , denote the to-
tal number of tests between the authenticator and the valid
authenticatee, or between the authenticator and the invalid
authenticatee. Accordingly, let NTA and NFA denote the total
numbers of true acceptances and false acceptances, respec-
tively. The β and α are measured by NTA/NL and NFA/NI ,
respectively.
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Figure 17: ROCs for 8 different wearers with the valid
authenticatee device. The x-axis and y-axis of each
subfigure are α and β , respectively.
Fig. 16 shows the APCC- and RMSE-TouchAuth’s ROC
curves for different wearers with the invalid authenticatee
device when the signal length ℓ is 1 s. Different data points
on an ROC represent the results under different detection
threshold η. The SDR assessed using the authenticator’s
and the valid authenticatee’s iBEP signals in each experi-
ment is included in the corresponding subfigure. We can
see that across different wearers with the invalid authentica-
tee, APCC-TouchAuth is comparable or superior to RMSE-
TouchAuth in terms of the detection performance. This is be-
cause that APCC inherently captures the correlation between
the iBEP signals on the same moving hand. In contrast, as the
RMSE captures sample-wise differences between two signals,
two uncorrelated signals with similarly small amplitudes can
give a small RMSE value, leading to a false acceptance. Note
that the RMSE has been adopted as a dissimilarity metric
for physiological sensing [32]. However, it is ill-suited for
iBEP sensing because the iBEP signal amplitude has a large
dynamic range depending on the ambient EF’s gradient. This
is different from physiological signals that often have stable
ranges of signal amplitude. From Fig. 16, we can see that
APCC-TouchAuth achieves a high β value (100%) subject to
an α upper bound of 1%, except for the wearer P11. For P11,
APCC-TouchAuth achieves a β value of 100% subject to an
α upper bound of 4%.
We collect another set of data, where R wears an invalid
authenticatee and Pi holds an authenticator and a valid au-
thenticatee. Thus, this set of experiments evaluate the detec-
tion performance of TouchAuth for different users wearing
the valid authenticatee against a certain user wearing the in-
valid authenticatee. Fig. 17 shows the ROCs for eight different
wearers with the valid authenticatee. Similar to the results
in Fig. 16, APCC-TouchAuth achieves high-profile ROCs and
outperforms RMSE-TouchAuth. The results in Figs. 16 and
17 show that the detection performance of TouchAuth is not
wearer-specific.
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Figure 18: Experiments in indoor environments.
Figure 19: ROCs in various environments.
6.2 Various Indoor Environments
Two wearers conduct experiments in eight different indoor
environments as shown in Fig. 18, which include a living
room, a study room, a kitchen, two bedrooms, a corridor,
a meeting room, and an open area of a lab. One wearer
carries the authenticator and a valid authenticatee and the
other carries the invalid authenticatee. Fig. 19 shows the
snapshots of some environments and the measured SDRs
and ROCs in the eight environments. We can see that in
certain environments, the RMSE-TouchAuth performs poorly.
Investigation on the raw iBEP signals shows that in these
environments, the iBEP signals of the authenticator and the
invalid authenticatee have similar amplitudes. In all the eight
environments, APCC-TouchAuth achieves high β values (≥
97%) subject to an α upper bound of 1%. If the α upper bound
is relaxed to 4%, the β value of 100% can be achieved.
6.3 Various Possible Interfering Sources
From our discussion in §3 and the measurement results in
§4.2.1, the iBEP measurement is mainly caused by the am-
bient EF. The MFs generated by the operating currents of
electric appliances will have little impact on the iBEP sensing.
However, some appliances, especially those based on motors
and high-frequency switched-mode power, may generate
interference to the iBEP sensing. This is because that unlike
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Figure 20: ROCs with various nearby appliances.
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the 50Hz current-induced MF that generates little/no EF,
the high-frequency currents caused by the frictions between
the motor’s brush and stator as well as the switched-mode
power may generate propagating electromagnetic waves. As
a result, the EFs generated by the appliances and powerlines
may weaken each other, making the overall EF weaker. Thus,
we conduct a set of experiments with various home appli-
ances including toaster, electric kettle, hair dryer, ceiling fan,
blender, and induction cooker. Specifically, two wearers, one
with a valid authenticatee and the other with an invalid au-
thenticatee, stand close to a certain appliance to collect iBEP
traces. Fig. 20 shows the SDR and the APCC-TouchAuth’s
ROCs for various appliances when the appliance is on and
off. We can see that, for a certain appliance, the SDR may
increase or decrease when the appliance is switched on. This
is because that the interference from the appliance may be
constructive or destructive to the EF generated by the build-
ing’s power cabling. The operating status of the induction
cooker causes the largest SDR change of more than 5 dB.
This is due to the high-frequency switched-mode current in
the cooker’s internal inductor. As a result, the ROC drops
slightly when the induction cooker is switched on. However,
APCC-TouchAuth still achieves a high β value (100%) subject
to an α upper bound of 2.5%.
The signaling phase of a cell phone call often interferes
with audio systems because of the intermittent wireless
power pulses. Thus, we also evaluate the impact of cell
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phone calls on APCC-TouchAuth. In the experiments, the
wearer holds a smartphone, a valid authenticatee, and the
authenticator in one palm. Another wearer holding an in-
valid authenticatee stands 0.5m away. Fig. 21(a) shows the
ROCs at different phases of a phone call. We can see that
the phone call does not affect the detection performance of
APCC-TouchAuth.
Secondly, we use a circuit seeker (Greenlee CS-8000) that
is capable of up to 4 miles circuit tracing [5] to inject noises
into the power network serving the lab in which we conduct
experiments. The injector of CS-8000 is plugged into a power
outlet, injecting a 15 kHz signal into the power network;
the seeker can detect the 15 kHz electromagnetic emanation
from the powerlines. We conduct experiments in proximity
of a powerline close to the injector. Fig. 21(b) shows the ROCs
when the injector is in operation or not. We can see that the
noise injection does not affect TouchAuth.
Lastly, we evaluate the impact of the skin moisture condi-
tions on TouchAuth. We conduct two experiments, in which
the user holds the authenticator using a wet hand. He also
holds a valid authenticatee. Another user stands 0.5m away
holding an invalid authenticatee. Fig. 21(c) shows the ROCs
for dry and wet skin moisture conditions. We can see that
the skin moisture has little impact on the performance of
TouchAuth.
6.4 Impact of Signal Length ℓ
We evaluate the impact of the signal length ℓ on the detection
performance of TouchAuth. We combine the data collected
from 12 different wearers in §6.1 into a single dataset. Based
on the combined dataset, Fig. 22 shows the β achieved by
APCC-TouchAuth and RMSE-TouchAuth versus ℓ when α ≤
1% or α ≤ 2%. APCC-TouchAuth’s β increases sharply when
ℓ ≤ 1 s. When ℓ > 1 s, its β increases with ℓ slowly. This
suggests that a setting of ℓ = 1 s well balances the detection
performance and sensing time. The β-ℓ curves for RMSE-
TouchAuth exhibits a similar pattern. Moreover, consistent
with the results in §6.1 and 6.2, RMSE-TouchAuth is inferior
to APCC-TouchAuth.
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6.5 TouchAuth Devices’ Proximity
In the previous subsections, the authenticator and the valid
authenticatee are in the same palm. In this set of experi-
ments, they are placed at different locations on the user’s
body. Fig. 23 shows APCC-TouchAuth’s ROC curves. When
the two devices are on the palm and the wrist of the same
hand, respectively, a high-profile ROC is achieved. When
the two devices are on (i) the right palm and the right el-
bow, respectively, or (ii) the right palm and the head, respec-
tively, the detection performance is degraded. This shows
that TouchAuth is applicable to the example use scenarios
discussed in §1 where the two devices are in proximity on
the same body. In §7, we will further discuss the impact of
the proximity requirement on the usability of TouchAuth.
6.6 Mimicry Attack
We follow the data collection methodology described in §6.1
to collect another dataset in the lab, except that each wearer
Pi with the invalid authenticatee mimics the hand move-
ments of the wearer R with the authenticator and the valid
authenticatee. The R performs simple and repeated hand
movements, such that Pi can follow easily. The distance
between R and Pi is about 0.5m. Fig. 24 shows the APCC-
TouchAuth’s β versus ℓ subject to various α upper bounds.
The error bars show the minimum, maximum, and mean of
the β values among different R-Pi pairs in the dataset. Com-
pared with Fig. 22, when ℓ is small (e.g., 0.1 s), the mimicry
attack degrades APCC-TouchAuth’s detection performance.
However, the attack impact can be fully mitigated by adopt-
ing a larger ℓ setting (e.g., ℓ = 1 s).
6.7 Heterogeneous Devices
In this set of experiments, the authenticator and the invalid
authenticatee are based on Z1 motes (denoted by Z1-1 and
Z1-2); the valid authenticatee is based on an Adafruit’s Flora
[1], an Arduino-based wearable platform. The top part of
Fig. 25 shows a Flora-based TouchAuth prototype device
with a 3D-printed insulating wristband and a conductive
thread creating the body contact. We use a laptop computer
to relay the communications between the Bluetooth-based
Flora and the Zigbee-based Z1. The bottom part of Fig. 25
shows the zoomed-in view of the signals captured by the
three devices. We can see that although the Z1 and Flora
have different direct current lines, the Z1-1 authenticator
and the Flora authenticatee are highly correlated. Based on
this setup, with ℓ = 1 s, APCC-TouchAuth achieves a β value
of 100% subject to an α upper bound of 1%. This result shows
that TouchAuth can be applied on heterogeneous devices.
7 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section discusses limitations and the applicable scope
of TouchAuth.
Applicability to outdoors: The outdoor naturally occur-
ring EF is too weak to be exploited by TouchAuth. Thus,
TouchAuth is not applicable outdoors, where it will reject all
authentication requests due to too weak iBEP signal strength
(cf. §5.1). As most smart objects are indoors and we spend
most of our time indoors (e.g., 87% on average for Americans
[22]), TouchAuth gives a satisfactory availability. Note that
the wide availability of the iBEP signals in indoor environ-
ments has been shown in existing studies [6–8, 49].
Proximity requirement: From the measurement study in
§4 and the evaluation results in §6.5, our approach requires
that the authenticator and the authenticatee are in proximity
on the same human body. For instance, in the example of
personalizing smart objects, the user should use the hand
with the wrist wearable to touch the objects. A wireless
reader needs to be placed close to a worn medical sensor to
be authenticated. We believe that this proximity requirement
introduces little overhead of using TouthAuth-based devices.
Nevertheless, TouchAuth offers a low cost and small form
factor solution based on ubiquitous ADCs only. Although
exiting IBC and physiological sensing approaches may not
have this proximity requirement, they generally require non-
trivial sensing devices that are more costly and of larger form
factors. In particular, the proximity requirement increases
the barrier for active attackers to steal the iBEP signals, since
they have to place a sensor close to the authenticator. In
contrast, if the body-area property is effective for the whole
body like for ECG/PPG, the attackers may attach a miniature
sensor to the clothing of the victim to steal the signal.
iBEP injection attack: If an attacker can generate a strong
ac EF that overrides the ambient EF, the attacker can infer
the s(t) sensed by the authenticator and spoof it to accept
an invalid authenticatee. However, the strong EF genera-
tion is non-trivial and inevitably requires bulky equipment.
Overriding the power grid voltage is generally impossible
unless the building’s power network is disconnected from
the mains grid and supplied by a power generator controlled
by the attacker. Another possible approach is to surround the
victim TouchAuth devices with two metal plates connected
with an ac generator. The bulky setting of the EF generation
renders the attack easily discernible by the TouchAuth user
and costly, unattractive to the attacker. Another possible
attack is to generate power surges in the power network by
frequently switching on and off high-power appliances like
space heaters. However, the surges will also generate easily
discernible disturbances to other appliances such as lights
and audio systems. Thus, we believe that the iBEP injection
attack, though possible, is unrealistic or easily discernible.
Other interferences: TouchAuth is based on the instan-
taneous similarity of the iBEP signals in close proximity
induced by the ambient EF. Hence, the similarity does not
depend on the user’s physiological state. Certain limited
scenarios may affect the iBEP. For example, a temporary
charging caused by taking off a sweater may override the
iBEP in a short time. However, such situations do not happen
frequently.
Applicability to implantable medical devices (IMDs):
Our measurement study (§4) and evaluation (§6) are based
on iBEPs collected from skins. We now discuss the applica-
bility of TouchAuth to devices implanted into human bodies.
From our discussion in §3.1, an electrostatically induced hu-
man body is an equipotential body. Thus, the ADC pin and
the ground of an IMD that is fully implanted into the human
body will have the same potential. As a result, the iBEP mea-
surement will be zero. We conducted a set of experiments to
verify this. We bought two types of homogeneous meat from
a supermarket. We wrapped a Z1 mote using cling film but
leaved its ADC-connected electrode out of the wrap. We fully
and partially implanted the mote into the meat. Under both
settings, the electrode has significant contact with the meat.
The partial implanting means that a small portion of the
cling film was still visible. The peak-to-peak amplitudes of
the iBEP signals measured by the Z1 mote fully and partially
implanted are about 0.05V and 0.1V, respectively. The peak-
to-peak amplitude of the latter case is comparable to some of
our measurement results on human skins (cf. §4). Frequency
analysis shows that the former is close to white noise and
the latter clearly exhibits a frequency of 50Hz. These results
suggest that TouchAuth is applicable to partially implanted
devices, such as insulin pumps, cochlear implants, foot drop
implants, etc.
8 RELATEDWORK
Device authentication andkey generation:Various phys-
iological signals have been exploited for contact-based device
authentication and key generation. Key generation establishes
Table 1: Comparison with existing approaches.
Ref. Signal Sensing time (s) α (%) β (%)
TouchAuth 1 2.0 94.2%
5 2.0 98.9%
[32] ECG+PPG ∼60 (67 IPIs) 2.1 93.5
∼30 (34 IPIs) 4.5 90.5
[42] PPG 12.8 0.1 99.9
[20] ECG ∼90 (90 IPIs) ∼0∗ ∼100∗
∗ [20] fuzzily states that its FAR and FRR are almost zero.
a secret symmetric key for a pair of nodes on the same hu-
man body. Using ECG and PPG for the above two tasks has
received extensive research. An early work [32] encodes the
interpulse intervals (IPIs) of ECG or PPG into a bit sequence
and performs authentication by comparing the Hamming
distance of two bit sequences with a threshold. The study
[47] generates IPI-based symmetric key for an IMD and an
external device. PSKA [42] and OPFKA [20] generate keys
from certain ECG/PPG features. Rostami et al. [38] quan-
tify ECG’s randomness in terms of entropy and design the
H2H authentication protocol. However, ECG/PPG sensors
often have large form factors due to the required physical dis-
tances between electrodes. Moreover, ECG/PPG sensing can
be vulnerable to video analytics [31, 46]. Table 1 compares
the performance of APCC-TouchAuth (from Fig. 22) and sev-
eral ECG/PPG device authentication approaches. TouchAuth
achieves comparable detection accuracy within shorter sens-
ing times. Recent studies have also exploited EMG [52] and
gait [48] for key generation. However, the multi-electrode
EMG sensor [52] is sizable and must be placed close to mus-
cles. Walking to generate keys [48] may be inconvenient and
the used inertial measurement units (IMUs) may be vulnera-
ble to remote acoustic attack [41].
Human body coupled capacitive sensing: The iBEP sens-
ing belongs to a broader area of capacitive sensing. A recent
survey [16] provides a taxonomy of capacitive sensing.We re-
view those on passively sensing the mutual impact between
the human body and ambient EF. The iBEP has been used for
touch [8] and motion sensing [6], keyboard stroke detection
[10], gesture recognition [7], wearables clock synchroniza-
tion [49]. Several studies use a single off-body electrode to
sense the change of ambient EF due to human’s electrophys-
iological signals [34] and body movement [33, 40]. Platypus
[15] uses an EF sensor array on the ceiling to localize and
identify a human walker. The EF change is due to the tribo-
electric effect and changes in capacitive coupling between
the walker and the environment. Wang et al. [45] use an ex-
ternal sound card as the ADC and three magneto-inductive
coil sensors to collect the electromagnetic interference (EMI)
radiated from various devices. The signatures contained in
the EMI are used for identifying the device the user is touch-
ing. Laput et al. [23] attach a modified software-defined radio
to the human body for sampling iBEP.When the user touches
an object, the class of the object can be recognized based on
the sampled iBEP signal. Yang et al. [50] develop a follow-up
research of [23] to recognize the identity, rather than the
class, of the touched object. However, the needed training
phase of [23, 45, 50] introduces overhead.
The human body can be used as a communication chan-
nel. Early studies [2, 26, 30, 53] build customized transmitter
and receiver for intra-body communication (IBC). Vu et al.
[44] design a wearable transmitter to convey identification
data to a touchscreen as the receiver. Holz et al. [19] use a
wrist wearable and touchscreen to measure bioimpedance
and identify the user. Hessar et al. [18] uses fingerprint scan-
ner and touchpad as the transmitter and a software-defined
radio attached to skin as the receiver. Yang et al. [51] show
that the transmitters can be LEDs, buttons, I/O lines, LCD
screens, motors, and power supplies. Roeschlin et al. [37]
design an IBC approach that estimates the body channel
characteristics to pair on-body devices. Although IBC can
be used for contact-based device authentication, it often re-
quires non-trivial transmitter/receiver devices. In contrast,
our approach requires a ubiquitous low-speed ADC only.
Other related studies: VAuth [12] uses a wearable token
device to sense the vibrations caused by the speech of the
wearer and match the vibration signal with the received
voice signal. The matched vibration and voice signals are
further used to verify that the voice signal received by a
voice assistant is really from the token wearer. Nyemkova
et al. [29] study the distinguishability of various electronic
devices based on the fluctuations of their internal EMI.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper explained the electrostatics of iBEP with support-
ing measurement results. Based on the understanding, we
designed TouchAuth and evaluated its same-body contact
detection performance via extensive experiments under a
wide range of real-world settings. Results show that Touch-
Auth achieves comparable detection accuracy as existing
physiological sensing approaches, but within much shorter
sensing times. Moreover, the uni-electrode iBEP sensor can
be miniaturized. TouchAuth offers a low-cost, lightweight,
and convenient approach for the authorized users to access
the smart objects found in indoor environments.
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